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ABSTRACT

The TRIPS Agreement can be read to reflect a static view of the structure
of intellectual property law. In this paper, we address whether – and how –
the TRIPS Agreement can be interpreted to give it more fluidity, and thus
to allow adjustments in national intellectual property regimes designed to
reflect the dynamic nature of information production. To focus that
inquiry, we concentrate on efforts to ensure a broader public domain for
“upstream” inventions by modifying various elements of US patent law.
The paper considers three stylized examples and asks whether each
approach could be adopted by the United States without falling afoul of the
TRIPS Agreement, as it is currently understood. Our purpose is to identify
interpretive approaches that allow member states to keep their laws attuned
to the developments and needs of science. In so doing, we also raise
broader questions regarding the level of formalism generated by the WTO
dispute settlement system, and the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement
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allocates power between supranational and national institutions, and
between international and national laws.
I. Introduction
The size and content of a rich public domain are affected by a constellation
of national intellectual property rules: provisions that define protectable
subject matter, establish threshold requirements for protection, delineate the
scope of the rights awarded, create defenses and exemptions from liability,
and set remedies for infringement.1 Since 1995, the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement)2 has
imposed specific limitations on the contours of these rules, and it thus
serves to regulate on an international level the ways in which members of
the WTO can shape the contents of the private and public domains.
At the time the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated, the main focus of
attention was on codifying then agreed-upon norms of protection. As a
result, the Agreement can be read to reflect a static view of the structure of
intellectual property law. Information production is, however, a dynamic
enterprise. Additions to the domain of knowledge can change the
intellectual landscape and thereby alter the creative opportunities—and
challenges—facing artists and inventors. New industries emerge, others
mature; nations have traditionally administered, interpreted, and modified
their rules to achieve the balance between public and private rights that is
appropriate, at any given time, for each field. The question we address in
this article is whether–and how–the TRIPS Agreement can be read with
equivalent fluidity, in order to allow adjustments in national regimes that
reflect the dynamic nature of information production. In a sense, this
problem is not new, as many of the WTO nations have operated under the
constraints of international obligations for over a century. Nonetheless, the
TRIPS Agreement raises unique concerns because it addresses a broader
range of issues than prior instruments and, as the first global intellectual
property agreement to include a compliance mechanism, it has
unprecedented bite.
To focus the inquiry, we concentrate on efforts in United States
patent law to ensure a broader public domain for “upstream” inventions,
that is, for discoveries so directly related to fundamental principles that
they dominate broad swaths of inventive opportunities.3 The expansion of
1

Public access to intellectual products can also turn on who owns the rights and
how the owner exploits the work. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, BayhDole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003)
(arguing that funding agencies should have greater authority to demand patent rights in
fundamental research results produced by universities in government-funded projects).
2
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr.
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
3
We concentrate on patent law rather than on other intellectual property regimes
because it confers a greater level of exclusivity and is concerned with cutting-edge
developments that are most likely to undermine core assumptions of intellectual property
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patentable subject matter to include upstream inventions has led concerned
observers to suggest that other elements of patent law must also be
modified in order to re-create public-domain space in which work can be
undertaken in accordance with traditional scientific norms.4 To be sure,
expanding the categories or the scope of protectable subject matter in
domestic law comports with a basic premise of the TRIPS Agreement,
which leaves considerable discretion to WTO members to provide
protection in excess of mandated minimum levels.5 But these proposed
modifications, by contracting protection, would arguably raise TRIPScompliance concerns and thus bring into question the resilience of the
Agreement.
The public domain could be reconstituted in a variety of ways: by
modifying the definition of statutory subject matter, elevating the threshold
for protection, adjusting the scope of rights, creating new exemptions, or
imposing new types of relief. Its contours could also be changed by
revising non-intellectual property regimes (including administrative and
procedural law) and by altering the mechanisms and institutions that
facilitate private ordering. Evaluating a broad range of approaches would
allow us to fully probe the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to see
which are most hospitable to protecting the public domain of science. At
this point, however, we look at only three stylized examples. These are: (1)
excluding certain discoveries from the subject matter of eligible patent
protection; (2) creating a statutory exemption that gives courts discretion to
permit unauthorized uses of sufficient social significance; and (3) varying
the right to relief. This article asks whether each approach could be
adopted by the United States without falling afoul of the TRIPS Agreement
as it is currently construed.
Our purpose is not to predict the outcome of future disputes—there
are far too few WTO precedents for that. Rather, our goal is to identify
interpretive approaches that allow members to keep their laws attuned to
the developments and needs of science. We also raise broader questions
regarding the level of formalism generated by the WTO dispute settlement
system, and the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement allocates power
between supranational and national institutions, between international and
national laws.
II. Upstream Patenting and its Relationship to Technological Progress
As suggested earlier, there is growing concern that prospects for innovation
are jeopardized by trends in U.S. patent law that increasingly recognize
private claims to core principles of knowledge, of special significance to
law; we deal with U.S. law because the problem appears to us more acute there. For
example, because the European Patent Convention (EPC) and the Japanese Patent Act
require that inventions be susceptible to “industrial application,” these statutes may not so
easily cover upstream inventions. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of The Liberal
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1178 (1999).
4
See below text accompanying nn. 6-11.
5
See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules
Can Affect Domestic Protection [this volume].
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basic research. At one time, science was considered distinct from
technology, and intellectual property law was predicated on the existence
of an analogous doctrinal boundary between basic and applied research.6
Increasingly, however, United States patent law recognizes private claims
that cross the border between fundamental knowledge and commercial
application. This development may reflect the science-intensive nature of
modern technology, which makes recent advances inherently dual in
character;7 it may also be caused by changes in the organization of science,
including the reliance of small, highly networked knowledge-intensive
firms on patents to signal technical and business competence,8 or by the
emergence of research organizations (such as universities) that look to
patent rights to support fundamental research.9 Whatever the cause, patent
protection has moved upstream.
The net result is troublesome. Patents may now confer power not
only in product markets,10 but also in innovation markets. As such, these
patents can have broad significance. Because second comers can often
invent around end-use inventions, patents rarely monopolized product
markets. In contrast, a patent on, say, the structural information of a
protein, or on a metabolic pathway, or a computer operating system, could
give the patentee control over all work involving that protein or pathway,
or all opportunities to create application programs for that system. As a
result, there is growing evidence suggesting that—at least in the United
States—patent rights over research opportunities have begun to hinder
progress by chilling innovation and impeding the production of new
knowledge.11

6

See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (defining the utility required
for patent protection as end-use rather than research-use utility). See also Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (holding that packets containing
mixtures of bacteria were “no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of
nature” and hence unpatentable); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (holding
that abstract principles are not statutory subject matter).
7
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); State St. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
851 (1999). See also Francis Narin & Dominic Olivastro, Status Report: Linkage Between
Technology and Science, 21 RES. POL’Y 237 (1992) (using citation measures to
demonstrate that the tie between science and technology is becoming closer over time and
is more pronounced in drugs, medicine, chemistry, and computing than in fields such as
machinery and transportation).
8
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002); Walter
M. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportunities and Constraints
Associated with Relational Contracting in Knowledge-Intensive Fields, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY 251 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
9
See, e.g., Bayh Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).
10
In this context, product market means the market for products, processes, and
the products of processes.
11
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary
Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES,
above n. 8. See generally, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 59-64 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
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III. Hypothetical Solutions and Their International Implications
There is considerable debate among policymakers on such matters as
whether the benefits of these developments outweigh their costs and
whether private parties will find their own ways to contract around
potential bottlenecks. In this article, however, we ask a different question:
what can national legislators who perceive a problem do to fix it, consistent
with their countries’ international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement?
A. Subject matter exclusions
The most direct way to deal with the problem of upstream patenting might
be to define patentable subject matter in a way that excludes inventions
with significant upstream applications from eligibility for protection. This
approach could be implemented across the board, or limited to areas where
evidence suggests that the chill to research is potentially great. Although
drawing such lines would be difficult, advocates of this approach claim it is
superior to alternative means of protecting the public domain because it
creates bright-line rules on which investors can rely.
For example, Richard Epstein has suggested that the “use value” of
patents—their value in product markets—should be compared to their
“blocking” value—their upstream significance in innovation markets.
When the blocking value exceeds the use value in a particular field,
inventions within that field should not be considered patentable.12 He gives
the example of expressed sequence tags (ESTs), short sequences of coding
DNA, noting that while the useful applications of ESTs barely meet the
utility standard of current patent law, “[e]ach EST is a gateway to some
gene on which useful work could be done.” Since the primary use of a
patent on an EST would thus be to block others from entering that gateway,
Epstein argues that such patents should not issue.
John Barton takes a different approach. He would exclude specific
subject areas whenever the blockage problem becomes acute. He gives as
an example, proteomics–information about the shape of the body’s protein
molecules that is crucial to understanding and predicting how the body will
respond to pharmaceutical interventions.13
Would such carve-outs meet the requirements of article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement, which provides that, subject to defined exceptions,
“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the . . . field of technology”?14 To analyze that
question, one can usefully distinguish between de iure and de facto forms
of discrimination. In the former situation, specific fields of technology are

12

Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 168-88 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003).
13
John H. Barton, United States Law of Genomic and Post-Genomic Patents, 33
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 779-910 (2002).
14
TRIPS Agreement, above n. 2, art. 27.1.
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carved out for special treatment; in the latter, rules that are facially neutral
have disparate effects on particular subject areas.
The language of article 27 is clearly aimed at prohibiting de iure
discrimination with respect to the availability and enjoyment of patent
rights. The legislative history of the Agreement is replete with indications
that a primary concern of the negotiators was to eliminate blanket
exclusions of certain types of patentable subject matter (most notably
drugs, agrochemicals, and foodstuffs).15 Thus, a subject matter exclusion
directed at biotechnology generally, or at specific areas within
biotechnology, such as proteomics, would almost certainly run afoul of the
Agreement.
An approach that comes conceptually closer to Richard Epstein’s
suggestion is, however, more difficult to analyze. Facially, the approach is
neutral–it would bar patents on discoveries of predominantly upstream
significance in every field of technology. Nonetheless, it would more
profoundly affect fields that are science-intensive and fields where the
targets of protection have high informational content. For example, it
would have greater impact on biotechnology and computer science than on
chemistry or mechanical engineering. Thus, while the proposal would not
directly implicate the motivating rationale for article 27.1, its potentially
disparate effect on different fields could conceivably fall afoul of the literal
text of article 27.
Thus far, there have been no decisions directly addressing subject
matter exclusions under article 27, but we inform our analysis with the
observation that WTO panels tend to hew closely to text when resolving
disputes.16 For example, the panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical Products
considered article 27 in the course of reviewing the TRIPS consistency of
two exemptions that Canada had enacted in its patent law. One of these,
the so-called regulatory review exemption, permitted use or manufacture of
a patented invention solely for purposes of obtaining regulatory approval.
The intent was apparently aimed at promoting competition between generic
and proprietary pharmaceutical companies by facilitating market entry by
generics at the moment of patent expiration. While the exemption was
expressed in technologically neutral language, the European Union argued
that its impact on the pharmaceutical industry violated article 27.1 under,
essentially, a disparate impact theory.
The WTO panel rejected the EU’s specific contention, but only
after Canada assured it that the exemption was indeed neutral in the sense
that it was legally available to every product subject to marketing approval
requirements. In fact, the panel agreed with the EU’s larger point, that the
15

See Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R ¶ 4.6
fn.27 (WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 2000) (hereinafter “Canada-Pharmaceutical
Products”).
16
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual
Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1005-06 (2002) (“Webster’s has become an
essential research tool in WTO TRIPS litigation.”).
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Agreement barred both de iure and de facto discrimination. In other
words, it appears that under this decision, the mere lack of a textual
limitation to particular fields will not immunize a provision from challenge.
Still, it may be possible to salvage Epstein=s approach. Patent laws
tend to apply differently across industrial sectors, depending on such
factors as the level of skill in particular fields.17 It is difficult to believe
that members of the WTO would have so readily committed themselves to
altering this approach to their domestic lawmaking. Indeed, the panel
acknowledged as much, stating, “article 27 does not prohibit bona fide
exemptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product
areas.”18
In fact, the panel’s report can be read as prohibiting de facto
discrimination only when the claim includes some additional element, such
as an allegation of an intent to discriminate. Thus, the panel stated, “it was
not proved . . . that the objective indications of purpose demonstrated a
purpose to impose disadvantages on pharmaceutical patents in particular,
as is often required to raise a claim of de facto discrimination.”19 While
panels, both in the TRIPS20 and broader WTO contexts,21 have
acknowledged the difficulty of identifying (and scrutinizing) the purposes
behind particular national laws, we find it entirely appropriate that those
claiming de facto discrimination should be required to demonstrate some
element—such as intent—over and above those required to establish de
iure cases of discrimination. At the very least, those defending an
exclusion should be permitted to rebut a showing of disparate treatment by
demonstrating a legitimate purpose. What these demonstrations might
entail we leave to another day, but they might be satisfied by, for example,
demonstrating a close linkage between the exclusion and the particular
organizational or institutional structure (such as a bifurcated generic and
proprietary drug industry—or a decision to rely on patents to selectively
support fundamental research) in the country in question.
The foregoing suggests that variations in result must be evaluated
carefully when determining whether national law violates the
technological-neutrality principle. Discrimination is not the same as
differential treatment. This is not to foreclose the possibility that a claim
for de facto discrimination under article 27.1 could succeed; but this
reading does suggest that nations retain power to modify their notions of
statutory subject matter along the lines of the Epstein proposal in order to
deal with changes in the relationship between basic science and end-use
technologies.
17

See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent-Law Technology-Specific?,
17 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002).
18
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, ¶ 7.92.
19
Id., at ¶ 7.105 (emphasis added).
20
See United States–Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTR/DS/160/R
(WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 2000) [hereinafter United States—Section 110(5)].
21
See generally Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National
Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW. 619, 626-633 (1998).
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In fact, even more targeted carve-outs of the sort proposed by
Barton may be permissible. Although we recognize that such a conclusion
runs headlong into the literalism that panels have exhibited in interpreting
TRIPS, if a legitimate policy objective can be effectuated by a narrow,
technology-specific exclusion, we fail to see why article 27.1’s
commitment to formal neutrality should force WTO members to adopt
exclusions that are broader than necessary. Such an approach would appear
to run counter to the underlying thrust of the TRIPS Agreement toward
enhanced protection. We address this paradox below in connection with
our discussion of article 30.22
B. Exemptions
To the extent that the problem with upstream patents is their capacity to
block pure research, another solution would be to permit certain activities
to be undertaken without a patentee’s authorization, in return for payment
of a nonmarket-based rent (or for free). For example, Maureen O’Rourke
proposed a patent law exception, analogous to the fair use defense of
copyright law, tailored to the unique concerns of the patent industries. Her
analysis would consider (i) the nature of the advance represented by the
infringing work; (ii) the purpose of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and
strength of the market failure that prevents a license from being concluded;
(iv) the impact of the use on the patentee’s incentives and overall social
welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented invention.23 A court would use
these factors to determine whether a patented invention could be used
without authorization, and also to assess royalties.
Professor O’Rourke’s proposal, if enacted into domestic law, could
indeed solve the upstream patent problem by freeing patented inventions
for use in fundamental research. However, articles 27 and 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement each present problems for this approach.
1. Article 30’s “three-part test”
Article 30 provides that exceptions from liability for patent infringement
are permissible if they (a) are limited, (b) do not unreasonably conflict with
a normal exploitation of a patent, and (c) do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties. O’Rourke’s proposal appears to accommodate
these criteria by requiring courts to consider similar parameters. This
conclusion, however, is not without doubt because there is a question
whether WTO adjudicators will tolerate the amount of discretion that this
approach gives to domestic courts. Certainly, the factors that courts
consider when exercising that discretion would become critical to a finding
of TRIPS-compatibility.

22

See text below at n. 54.
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COL. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000).
23
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Our analysis of the relevant issues is informed by two panel reports,
Canada–Pharmaceutical Products discussed above, and United States–
Section 110(5).24 In the former, two exemptions were challenged: the
regulatory review exemption described earlier, and a stockpiling exemption
that enabled the generic industry to manufacture patented products within
the last six months of a patent term (for sale upon expiry of the term). Two
exemptions were also at issue in the Section 110(5) case, both of which
permitted the playing of recorded copyrighted music in commercial
establishments. In each case, it was claimed that the exemptions at issue
satisfied each of the cumulative three steps of the applicable test for
permissible exceptions (article 30 for patents, article 13 for copyright).25
(a) Scope of Uses: “Limited” Exceptions. The Canada-Pharmaceutical
Products panel stated that the term “limited,” which is found only in article
30,26 required that the exemption be a narrow one, which the panel
measured by reference to the extent to which the rights of the patentee were
curtailed.27 The stockpiling exemption was found not to be “limited”
because, during the last six months of the statutory term, it negated all
protection under three of the patentee’s five guaranteed rights (make, use,
or sell) with no limitations on the quantities produced or the market
destination of the products.28 In contrast, the regulatory review exemption
was considered “limited” because it narrowly curtailed the patentee’s
exclusive rights. The extent of the acts permitted (i.e., those that were
necessary to comply with the regulatory approval process) was small and
narrowly bounded.29
On its face, O’Rourke’s proposed exemption resembles the invalid
stockpiling exemption in that it would appear to curtail potentially all of a
patentee’s exclusive rights. One could certainly argue that if a provision
was facially unlimited, then it should be doomed. However, the Appellate
Body has cautioned that panels should not assume that a member would act
inconsistently with its international obligations.30 If, in fact, courts develop
24
See Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15; United States – Section
110(5), above n. 20.
25
See TRIPS Agreement, above n. 2, arts. 13, 30.
26
The first step of the copyright test confines copyright exceptions to “certain
special cases,” which requires, among other things, that the exception be clearly defined.
United States–Section 110(5), above n. 20, ¶¶ 6.107-6.110.
27
The panel concluded that the first step in the three-step test does not require
consideration of the economic impact of the exemption because that concern was taken up
by the second and third steps of the test. See Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n.
15, ¶ 7.49. Thus, even if the adoption of the proposed fair use or experimental use
exemption did give rise to substantial economic impact (because, for example, protecting
research opportunities represents a large part of the patentee’s return at present), that
would not of itself prevent the exemption from being regarded as limited.
28
In certain respects, the panel appeared to be incorporating some of the
considerations relevant to analysis under article 31, which governs the grant of
compulsory licenses, into the article 30 analysis.
29
Canada–Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, at ¶ 7.45.
30
United States–Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R ¶ 259 (WTO Appellate Body 2001) (citing Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, ¶ 74 (WTO Appellate Body 2000).
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principles that limit the broad language of O’Rourke’s proposal to bring it
closer to the approved regulatory review exception, then it should satisfy
the first step of the three-step test in article 30.
(b) Economic Impact: Conflict with Normal Exploitation. The CanadaPharmaceutical Products panel concluded that the normal practice of
exploitation was “to exclude all forms of competition that could detract
significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a patent’s grant of
market exclusivity.”31 Courts could ensure compliance with this standard
most directly by considering whether a challenged domestic provision
compromised significant economic opportunities.32 Yet, the defense might
survive challenge even if it were to render non-infringing certain uses or
acts for which patentees currently extracted payment. The notion of
normalcy should not be static but should evolve through successive
interpretations of article 30 by panels, the Appellate Body, the TRIPS
Council, and future ministerial negotiations.33 As the two panels
acknowledged, while this understanding should take account of national
practices, especially with regard to typical means of exploiting the patent
and the source of that commercial capacity, normalcy is ultimately a
normative question—it depends on a vision of the just balance between
proprietary rights and public access interests, and not purely on past
practices. We suggest that the factors mentioned by the panels and the
Appellate Body should be considered, but that the normative question
should permeate the entire analysis.34
(i) National Practices. In part, the Canada-Pharmaceutical Products panel
treated the ability to exploit the invention exclusively even after patent
expiration as normal because it was typical. Here the panel may have meant
that several WTO members had established premarket clearance procedures
that effectively prolonged the period of exclusivity beyond the time of
patent expiration.35
31

Canada–Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, ¶ 7.55.
Such an approach might appear unduly internationalist in the current political
climate. Thus, we would rest on the canon of statutory construction that instructs judges
to interpret domestic law, where possible, in accordance with international obligations.
33
Cf., Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 5 (WTO Ministerial Conference, 14 Nov. 2001) (“while
maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize . . . flexibilities”).
The traditional sources of customary international law (including member state
institutions) might also supply meaning to the concept.
34
These factors are not meant to be exclusive; in other cases, additional
considerations may be relevant.
35
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, at ¶ 7.56. It is possible that the
panel was referring to the fact that some post-exploitation was typical of patents generally
or that it was employed by “most patent owners.” Thus, in rejecting Canada’s categorical
assertion that post-expiration market exclusivity could not be normal, the panel obliquely
referred to the fact that “some of the basic rights granted to all patent owners, and
routinely exercised by all patent owners, will typically produce” such exclusivity. Id. at ¶
7.56 (emphasis added). Likewise, the panel rejected the EU’s argument that patent
expiration should be irrelevant to normalcy because it did not address itself to the panel’s
view of normal, namely, it did not offer a “demonstration that most patent owners extract
the value of their patents in the manner barred by the [challenged exemption].” Id. at ¶
7.58 (emphasis supplied). Thus, although the panel sought to examine what was “common
32
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In one sense, O’Rourke’s proposal does well under this subtest.
Exemptions to support research are, in fact, typical of member states’
intellectual property laws. For example, the United States has long had an
experimental use defense for work that is solely for the “purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste.”36 So, too, do other industrial nations, such
as Japan and Germany.37 Moreover, the EU is currently proposing
exemptions for “acts done privately for non-commercial purposes,” and for
“acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the
patented invention.”38 In another sense, however, O’Rourke’s proposed
approach could be in trouble. The “typical” defense is extremely narrow;39
because O’Rourke’s proposal is multi-factored and heavily based on
judicial discretion, it will be difficult to predict its applicability to any
given situation. The resulting uncertainty could act as a drag on patent
value.
Nonetheless, we think the proposal can be salvaged. Although state
practice is clearly relevant to the creation of customary international law,
existing national laws should not of themselves be permitted to entrench an
international norm. Such an approach exalts national laws inappropriately.
The norms of international law are cautiously and appropriately driven by
concerns of consensus and permitting variations in national laws. National
laws represent a more ambitious attempt to articulate an ideal norm suited
to a more focused and homogenous context.
Furthermore, because states are generally free to exceed
internationally mandated minima, there is a baseline issue: a denial of
exclusivity may be from a level of protection that exceeds the
internationally mandated standard. Privileging a particular national
standard would, in fact, be somewhat perverse. States would have a hard
within a relevant community,” Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, at ¶ 7.54, it
did not carefully define the “relevant community.” Moreover, in United States-Section
110(5), the panel declined to address the EU’s contention that “comparative references to
other countries with a similar level of socio-economic development could be relevant to
corroborate or contradict data from the country primarily concerned.” See United States –
Section 110(5), above n. 20, ¶ 6.189.
36
See, e.g., Peppenhausen v. Falke, 19 Fed. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1861) (“experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a
philosophical taste, or curiosity”); W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS, § 898 (1890).
37
See German Patent Act of 1981, § 11, No. 2 (“[t]he effects of the patent shall
not extend to acts performed for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the
patented invention.”); Japanese Patent Law of 1959, as amended through 6 May 1998,
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or research”); see also APS van der Merwe, Experimental Use and the Submission of Data
for Regulatory Approval, INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 380 (2000).
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time experimenting with higher levels of protection if international
intellectual property law prevented them from later re-assessing and
restoring the level of protection to one that hews closer to the minimum
standard.
Moreover, barring reforms of this type would prevent WTO
members from adjusting their national laws to accommodate changing
economic and social circumstances. It would thus validate the refrain of
many critics of recent international intellectual property developments that
the system operates as a one-way ratchet.
Indeed, the CanadaPharmaceutical Products panel suggested as much, noting that “the
specific forms of patent exploitation are not static . . . for to be effective
exploitation must adapt to changing forms of competition due to
technological development and the evolution of marketing practices.”40
Because it is the complexity of modern technology that gives rise to the
complications in O’Rourke’s proposal, an argument could be made that the
proposal would be consistent with typical national practice.
(ii) Typical Means of Exploiting the Patent. In determining normalcy for
purposes of article 30, the Canada-Pharmaceutical Products panel may
alternatively have been considering what right holders regard as typical
exploitation practices. However, it was clearly unwilling to rely on that
ground alone. Likewise, the United States–Section 110(5) panel held that
the extent to which rights holders actually exercised their rights could not
be “fully indicative of normal exploitation.”41 Indeed, both panels offered
a definition of “normal” that explicitly encompassed a normative
assessment as well as an empirical analysis of what was “regular, usual,
typical or ordinary.”42
The application of this subpart to O’Rourke’s approach is difficult
to reckon. In part, there is another baseline issue. As noted earlier, it was
not typical for rights holders to assert control over innovation markets in
the past; now it has become more common. Neither panel provided a time
frame in which typical exploitation should be judged, yet it is difficult to
see how practices in 2004 have any greater claim to determine normalcy
than practices in 1994. Thus, restoring the level of protection to that which

40
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, ¶ 7.55. Admittedly, this
language appears largely directed at efforts to expand forms of exploitation, but the
general proposition holds true.
41
United States–Section 110(5), above n. 20, ¶ 6.196. The patent standard in
article 30 (but not the copyright equivalent in art. 13) allows such conflicts provided they
are reasonable. It would thus appear to afford member states greater latitude on the second
leg of the patent exemptions test. But in both provisions, the permissible conflict is
measured against the same norm, that is, “normal exploitation.”
42
See id. ¶ 6.166 (“dynamic…approach, i.e., conforming to a type or standard”);
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, above n. 15, ¶ 7.54 (“The term [‘normal’] can be
understood to refer to an empirical conclusion about what is common within a relevant
community, or to a normative standard of entitlement.” The panel concluded that the word
‘normal’ was being used in article 30 in a sense that combined the two meanings.).
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existed before the line between basic and applied research was blurred
could pass muster.43
We are especially concerned that despite the panels’ language,
neither set of adjudicators took the normative dimension seriously; neither
went so far as to articulate a normative vision of exploitation. Instead, as
Jane Ginsburg has commented, the analysis in the Section 110(5) case
sought only to “anticipate what the empirical situation [would] be, [rather]
than [provide] an explanation of what the right holder’s markets should
cover.”44 The literature includes a rich body of intellectual property theory,
and the opening for normative assessment provides a vehicle for panels to
use this scholarship to develop international law. Of course, a commitment
to a broader approach would inevitably draw panels into more intrusive
assessments of national legislative values. But, as the Appellate Body
recognized in its first TRIPS report,45 and as the United States–Section
110(5) panel hints in its discussion of “normal,” it is the responsibility of
panels to make critical assessments of national law.46 Presumably, a WTO
member defending an exemption of this type could aid the adjudicators by
elaborating on the normative underpinnings of its approach (as O’Rourke
did in her article).47
(iii) Source of Commercial Capacity. The Canada-Pharmaceutical
Products panel declined to treat as normal the “additional period of de facto
market exclusivity created by using patent rights to preclude submissions
for regulatory authorization” because it was “not a natural or normal
consequence of enforcing patent rights.”48 Instead, it was the product of a
combination of patent laws and the regulatory approval scheme—a
commercial rather than a legal effect.
Clearly, a rigorous inquiry into the nature and source of control
should inform the analysis. Enhanced commercial exploitation may arise
from the availability of technological protection measures that reinforce
statutory rights; from contracts that parties enter on account of industry
43

See above text accompanying n. 7.
Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel
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India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
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Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 Case West
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structure or because the costs of challenging an exclusive right outweighs
the benefits of cooperation; or more darkly, from market power and undue
commercial leverage. Absent such inquiry, invalid assertions of rights and
the flexing of market muscle may be elevated to international law.
This analysis is not, however, helpful to O’Rourke’s proposal,
which is clearly aimed at curbing a control created by force of law.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the conclusion on normalcy
depends on an interaction of relevant factors, not a cumulative satisfaction
of each. The entire analysis must also be infused with normative content.
To the extent that O=Rourke is preserving a competitive research (as
opposed to end-use) market, her proposal furthers the goals of intellectual
property law.
c. Types of uses: Unreasonable Prejudice to Legitimate Interests. As the
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products panel acknowledged,49 the third step of
article 30 clearly involves a normative assessment. Thus, much of what we
said above is relevant here. However, because upstream patenting is new,
there is no international norm that deals with its impact on the research
environment.
When the Canada-Pharmaceutical Products panel found that there
was no controlling international norm in that case, it suggested deference to
local autonomy,50 and that approach may well support the O’Rourke
proposal, were it adopted by the United States. As noted earlier, the
traditional market for patented inventions is a product market; the right to
control research is, in most fields, slim. Hence, removing rights over
innovation markets in sectors where they are suddenly available should not
be regarded as prejudicing a legitimate interest (especially if all of the other
forms of exploitation continue to be recognized). Members of the WTO
should be free to realign the components in their constellation of patent law
rules and to restore the stable universe that once existed.51
The validity of the exemption is bolstered by the last clause of the
third step in article 30, which (unlike its copyright counterpart in article 13)
explicitly calls for a panel to “take account of the legitimate interests of
third parties.” The panel hinted that considerations such as society’s
interest in promoting progress, and scientists’ interest in free inquiry, might
be considered “legitimate” within the meaning of article 30.52 Further,
although the panel cautioned that articles 7 and 8, which speak of
promoting technological innovation to the mutual advantage of producers
and users, and of protecting public health and promoting the public interest,
cannot be used to reargue the balance struck in article 30 of the TRIPS
49
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Agreement, they can shed light on the meaning of “legitimate interests.”53
Thus, if the availability of the exemption depends, as O’Rourke
contemplates, on market failures that preclude contracts that would advance
overall social welfare, a panel might accept the argument that the
exemption was TRIPS-consistent.
2. Article 27’s technological neutrality
Another possible challenge to O’Rourke’s approach is rooted in the
technological neutrality principle of article 27, which the CanadaPharmaceutical Products panel read as imposing an additional hurdle for
WTO members seeking to invoke article 30 to justify domestic exemptions
to the exclusive rights required by international patent law. The panel
appeared to regard article 27.1 as a structural provision, part of the fabric of
the Agreement as a whole, which can be transposed to the analysis of other
provisions.
If article 27 does apply to exemptions within article 30, the
O’Rourke proposal appears vulnerable to challenge. Although this “fair
use” exemption would not be aimed at specific subject matters of
invention, it is likely that it would play out differently in different fields.
Indeed, the fifth factor in the O’Rourke analysis—the nature of the patented
invention—makes this possibility explicit.
We believe, however, that the O’Rourke approach is appropriate
because the policy concerns that underlie her analysis are more acute in
some fields than in others. To put this another way, we think the panel was
wrong in applying article 27.1 to exemptions. As noted earlier, there are
good reasons why different technologies or different uses may require
different judicial or legislative treatment. It seems counterproductive to
require socially desirable exemptive solutions to extend to all technologies
when technology-specific problems require technology-specific solutions.54
Indeed, requiring exemptions to be technologically neutral appears
particularly anomalous in that it tends to make a broader than necessary
exemption more sustainable under international law than a narrow
exemption. This outcome conflicts with the norm contained in article 30
that expressly requires the availability of exemptions to be evaluated in
terms of whether any given exemption is “limited.” A targeted exemption
that differentiated between different types of invention would limit a
patentee’s rights only in areas where there was a perceived imbalance
between public and private interests. Regardless of whether a panel might
be more sympathetic to an exemption that is cast in general terms, the
policies underlying the TRIPS Agreement favor exemptions that are either
targeted or, though framed broadly, evolve to permit particular limited
53
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uses. A formalist commitment to technology neutrality is inconsistent with
a purposive reading of the TRIPS Agreement.
To sum up, an analysis of O’Rourke’s proposal produces a mixed
picture. On the one hand, strong arguments could be made that the scope
of the exempted uses should be regarded as limited; as having an acceptable
economic impact; and as not interfering with legitimate interests. But these
arguments will be accepted only if panels assess article 30 issues through a
normative filter. A panel would also have to agree with us that the
structural use of article 27 is a mistake. If a more literalist view is taken,
the proposal may not be regarded as acceptable. It requires faith in the
discretion of domestic courts, it produces uncertainty and therefore
potentially reduces patent value. Moreover, it permits unprecedented
intrusions into important innovation markets that are protected by the force
of patent law, and it is specifically crafted to have a differential impact on
upstream technologies.
C. Remedies
A third way to protect the public domain of science is to vary the terms of
relief so as to immunize upstream researchers from liability for patent
infringement. One idea, proposed by one of us and modified by Richard
Nelson, would benefit non-commercial research organizations, especially
universities and their employees, if 1) the patented materials they wished to
utilize were not made available on reasonable terms; 2) the investigators
agreed to publish their research results; and 3) the investigators agreed
either to refrain from patenting the research results or to patent and then
license the result on a nonexclusive basis and on reasonable terms.55
The compatibility of this solution with TRIPS obligations is
difficult to gauge in light of the disputes resolved so far because none of
them has involved remedial issues.56 Immunizing certain users from
liability could be categorized as an exemption to the right conferred and
analyzed under article 30.57 If so, then the argument would be similar to
the one set out above, with the added observations that this approach curbs
the judicial discretion that engendered some ambivalence in our analysis of
the open-ended exemption. It also seems unlikely to intrude seriously on
55
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the patentee’s own interests. While it could reduce markets for research
tools, only those markets that the patentee refused to supply would be
affected. Some opportunities may also be lost in the innovation market, but
because these opportunities would likely be non-commercial fundamental
research opportunities, they are likely to be rather low on a profit-minded
patentee’s own priority list.
We are not, however, convinced that article 30, standing alone,
should provide the appropriate framework of analysis. While article 30
imposes well-established strictures of international law on what WTO
members can do, the TRIPS Agreement as a whole appears to envision far
more latitude at the remedial phase. The flexibility that the TRIPS
Agreement preserves is most evident in article 41, which sets out WTO
members’ enforcement obligations.58 Subsection 5 explicitly provides that
members are not required to enforce intellectual property law in a manner
different from how they enforce their laws in general. This deference
makes considerable sense. Members need discretion to choose the means
by which they satisfy effective enforcement obligations because
enforcement implicates questions of resources and institutional priorities
that go to the heart of national political ordering in ways that far transcend
intellectual property law.
Other more specific remedies provisions also create substantial
flexibility. Article 45 requires WTO members to give judicial authorities
power “to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to
compensate.”59 However, when a court exercises that authority, adequacy
is measured entirely by local conditions. In markets where demand for the
product—or ability to pay—is low and in markets that have price controls
in place, the compensatory award will be low.60 The award will, in other
words, reflect local conditions, desires, and needs. This is as it should be: a
patent is a right to exclude, not a right to exploit.
Even the provisions that protect the right to exclude can be read as
creating substantial space for sovereign interests. Although article 44.1
requires member states to give judicial authorities power to order injunctive
relief, nothing in the provision expressly requires courts to enter such
orders. United States law reads the same way in that it is interpreted to
give courts considerable discretion to tailor injunctions to specific (local)
conditions.61
Given this degree of flexibility, an approach based on remedial
immunity should be considered consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
58
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Monetary rewards could be reduced to zero for the same reasons that
monetary relief is traditionally low in some situations: the relevant user
groups—in this case, non-commercial research institutions—lack resources
to pay for the inputs they need. Moreover, the economic value of the use—
in this case, basic research—is highly speculative, and courts do not
generally award speculative damages.62
Injunctive relief is also denied for familiar reasons, sounding in the
need to deal with important social problems. In this case, that might
include an organizational structure for science in which fundamental and
applied scientific research are conducted in different institutions or in
networked environments. It could also be considered an effort to deal with
cultural aversions to entering into binding transactions with strangers in the
face of scientific and business uncertainty.
Admittedly, relief under this proposal is withheld across the board,
rather than on the typical case-by-case basis. Yet, efficiency or other
values often require the articulation of a rule that constrains equitable
discretion and reduces reliance on case-by-case analysis.63 An approach to
the enforcement provisions of TRIPS that prevented a WTO member from
choosing between a case—by—case or a rule-based approach might be
thought to impose on such a member the obligation to enforce intellectual
property law in a manner different from the enforcement of laws generally.
Indeed, where TRIPS negotiators thought that members had to be
constrained in permitting a broad rule-based approach to adjudication, they
included a provision to that effect.64 Finally, the requirement of “effective
remedies” in article 41.1 is preserved in that the patent remains valuable for
many purposes. For example, it can be used to extract remuneration in
other markets, and it retains its value as a signal to potential collaborators
and investors.
As a matter of policy, it makes sense that the net result should be
that member states retain authority to control the terms on which basic
research is conducted. Given that members appear free to hold down the
profits that innovators can earn by such actions as permitting parallel
imports, or imposing compulsory licenses or price controls,65 it is important
that they remain equally free to control the costs that innovators face.
Otherwise, price could, in theory, fall to the worldwide demand price (or to
the price set by the government with the most stringent price controls),
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while the costs of research and development would be entrenched by the
Agreement.66
IV. Concluding Observations
Our case studies demonstrate that a country that perceives a problem with
the patenting of upstream research has a variety of ameliorative approaches
at its disposal, each with different pay-offs as a matter of domestic policy.
Subject matter carve-outs are easy to administer, but hard to legislate;
exemptions may be easier to legislate, but difficult to administer; and
changing remedies has limited application. These approaches are also
likely to provoke different responses at the international level. Unless
article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement is read narrowly, subject matter
exclusions may be impermissible; while an open-ended exemption could be
heavily dependent upon a domestic interpretation that tracks international
standards. Although the immunity approach may have the best chance of
being approved by the WTO, it may be thought to violate remedies
obligations, especially for patented technologies that are principally utilized
in basic research.
Should the TRIPS Agreement be read to constrain national choices
in this formalistic way? Consider, for example, the provision of current
United States law on which the immunity defense outlined above was
based. It immunizes a “medical practitioner’s performance of a medical
activity” that would otherwise constitute infringement. If the analyses of
articles 30 and 44 that we put forward are rejected, then this provision
could also be found to violate the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, a subject matter
approach to surgical method patents would clearly be upheld under article
27.3(a), which permits members to exclude surgical methods from
patentability.67 It is difficult to see why WTO panels should adhere strictly
to this formalistic approach, which requires these choices to be analyzed
separately.
Of course, formalism may have a role to play. Our analysis also
raises the question whether any provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are
what we have called structural or horizontal in nature, part of the fabric of
the Agreement as a whole, which should be transposed to the analysis of
other provisions. The Canada-Pharmaceutical Products panel appeared to
regard article 27.1 as one such provision and superimposed its
technological neutrality principle on article 30. Although the Agreement
no doubt contains some provisions (such as national treatment) that possess
this structural character, panels should be cautious before elevating any
particular provisions to this status, especially when these are ostensibly
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directed at specific issues rather than delineated in that part of the
Agreement that addresses General Provisions and Basic Principles.68
In its latest TRIPS report, United States–Section 211, the Appellate
Body attached great weight to the characterization of the law being
challenged.69 Such formalism may be necessary in the early stages of a
lawmaking enterprise. However, characterization must be performed with
attention to substantive goals. In multistate private litigation where choice
of law is an issue, courts have long used a similar process. In those cases,
the forum does not regard itself as bound by the characterization of the
state that enacted the rule, but instead it makes its own assessment based on
the state interests that underlie the law.70 In our present context, WTO
panels should do likewise, especially in the early years when they are
considering state laws that were not formulated with TRIPS categories in
mind. The appearance of arbitrariness will best be avoided by a process of
characterization that is alert to the substantive purposes of intellectual
property law.
It is also important for panels to keep what might be called the
“neo-federalist” underpinnings of the TRIPS Agreement in mind. The
Agreement, as an instrument of intellectual property law, must strike a
balance between sufficient levels of protection to stimulate the desired
social and commercial activity undertaken by first-comers, and sufficient
limits on those rights to ensure the maximum socially useful exploitation of
that activity. It partly achieves this balance substantively by allocating
rights as between private and public interests, that is, between producers
and users of intellectual property. But the Agreement does not articulate an
international code authoritatively fixing that balance. It could not because
the precise balance is still heavily contested within individual countries.
Furthermore, where a particular country has settled on a specific balance,
there is no guarantee that that balance would optimize the supply of
innovation in a country of different competitive structure or economic
status.
TRIPS, like any international agreement, must also deal with issues
such as sovereignty, diversity, and legitimacy that pervade international
relations. It must accordingly allocate power between supranational and
national institutions, between national and international laws. Even when
prescriptive power resides at the international level, that power is typically
the authority to set boundaries within which a WTO member can act rather
than to impose a specific rule of law. But when power remains vested in
the members, their governments have substantial legislative discretion,
subject only to structural principles of the international intellectual property
68
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and trade regimes. In the TRIPS context, these allocations have the
additional effect of giving WTO members an important role in striking the
producer/user balance of intellectual property law.71
In the discussion above, much of our argument rested on
recognizing the importance of this neo-federalist structure. Thus, a
decision to allow WTO members to create a larger public domain by one
method or another may be a product not of an intellectual property balance
that the TRIPS Agreement mandated, but rather a consequence of the
conferral of autonomy on national governments. For our case study, it
seems to follow that the United States can enact a particular regime not
because it embodies a balance between public and private interests that was
struck in the TRIPS Agreement, but rather because that Agreement allows
its members to make a range of determinations, of which the one adopted
by the United States is a permissible option.
To put it another way, because the TRIPS Agreement was
negotiated with the goal of promoting international trade, the goals of
substantive balance common to domestic intellectual property systems are
barely discernable in its provisions. Nevertheless, panels must take
seriously the autonomy interests implicit in the structure of the
international intellectual property system, and they must allow sovereigns
to respond to changes in science, to the structure of their patent industries,
or to other social needs. Otherwise, a series of worldwide disutilities will
result. These include costs stemming from the imposition of a uniform
balance of producer and user interests which is in fact suitable for only one
or a few countries, and inefficiencies caused by the long-term entrenchment
of a balance appropriate for one point in time.72 The goals of intellectual
property law will thus be subverted, not furthered, by the international
regime. The costs of disregard for autonomy interest of states will also be
borne by the international intellectual property system, whose long-term
legitimacy and credibility rests in part upon participating states being best
able to achieve the international welfare goals that purport to be at the root
of the system.
In passing, we have suggested various systemic values that are
crucial to this approach to analyzing TRIPS obligations: the incentives
likely to optimize social utility may vary widely from country to country.
Permitting some diversity of approach allows nation states to act as
laboratories in the development of international rules; affording space for
the self-determination of sovereign states encourages voluntary and
ultimately more effective compliance with international norms. Besides,
universality may have costs, whether measured in economic or noneconomic terms. We plan to develop these systemic values at greater
71
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length in another article. Fully articulating the latitude afforded WTO
members under international intellectual property law will provide scholars
and national policymakers with a sense of the boundaries within which
these domestic debates can then occur.
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